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Abstract
In this paper we argue that government spending played a signiﬁcant role in stimulating the
wave of innovation that hit the U.S. economy in the late 1970s and in the 1980s, as well as the
simultaneous increase in inequality and in education attainment. Since the late 1970’s U.S. policy
makers began targeting commercial innovations more directly and explicitly. We focus on the shift
in the composition of public demand towards high-tech goods which, by increasing the market-size
of innovative ﬁrms, functions as a de-facto innovation policy tool. We build a quality-ladders non-
scale growth model with heterogeneous industries and endogenous supply of skills, and show that
increases in the technological content of public spending stimulates R&D, raises the wage of skilled
workers and, at the same time, stimulates human capital accumulation. A calibrated version of the
model suggests that government policy explains between 12 and 15 percent of the observed increase
in wage inequality in the period 1976-91.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E62, H57, J31, 031, 032, 041.
Keywords: R&D-driven growth theory, heteregeneous industries, ﬁscal policy composition,
innovation policy, wage inequality, educational choice.
1 Introduction
In the early 1980s we observe a substantial increase of public investment in high-tech sectors in the U.S.:
investment in equipment and software (E&S), which was 20 percent of total government investment
in 1980, climbs to about 40 percent in 1990 and to more than 50 percent in 2001.1 The composition
of private investment also switched towards E&S but more than a decade later, catching up with the
public trend in the 1990s (NSF 2002). Accompanying this acceleration of the technological intensity
of public spending we observe an 18 percent increase in the relative wage of skilled workers during the
1980s (CPS 1999).
In this paper we argue that the change in the composition of public spending reallocated market-
size from low-tech to high-tech industries, thus enlarging the market for more innovative products
and stimulating innovation. As innovation is a skill-using activity, government policy may have also
helped to stimulate the relative demand for skills and raise the skill-premium. Our analysis remarks
that although government procurement is not an explicit policy tool, it has often worked as ‘de facto’
innovation policy instrument.
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1E&S includes a group of investment goods that are considered more innovative than those included in structures
(see Cummins and Violante 2002 and Hobjin 2001b).
1We build a version of the quality-ladder growth model with endogenous supply of skills (Dinopou-
los and Segerstrom 1999). A new and key feature of our model is the introduction of heterogeneous
industries. The economy is populated by a continuum of monopolistic competitive industries with
asymmetric innovation power; in the language of quality-ladders models this implies that each sector
has a diﬀerent quality-jump any time an innovation arrives. In this setting we introduce government
policy, in the form of a public spending rule: the government can allocate its expenditure in manufac-
tured goods using a continuum of diﬀerent policy rules, from the extreme symmetric rule, where each
sector gets the same share of public spending, to an asymmetric rule, meaning that the sector with
the highest quality jump receives the greatest amount of government spending.
In our model, high-tech sectors are those where innovation brings technological improvements,
quality jumps, that are greater than average. There are two activities in the economy: manufacturing,
carried out by a continuum of asymmetric ﬁrms, and innovation activity or production of ideas. We
assume that unskilled labor is used exclusively in manufacturing and that ideas are produced using
only skilled labor. As the government reallocates spending from low to high-tech sectors, aggregate
proﬁts increase. Intuitively, higher quality jumps in high-tech sectors imply higher mark-ups and larger
proﬁts. Hence, a redistribution of public spending in favor of these sectors raises aggregate proﬁts
in the economy. In quality-ladder growth models monopoly proﬁts are the rewards for innovation
activities, so the increase in total proﬁts produced by the reshuﬄing of public spending will raise the
relative demand for skilled workers.
Finally, there is an education choice in the model that endogenizes skills formation. This implies
that, by increasing the skill premium, high-tech public spending will also raise the incentives to train
and accumulate skills. Therefore, wage inequality generated by our source of technical change will be
a general equilibrium result, where both the supply and the demand for skills are endogenous.
We adopt a broad interpretation of innovation in order to include all of those activities that are
targeted to increase ﬁrm proﬁts. In our model, workers performing innovative activities are those
workers that, with their intellectual skills, contribute to give a ﬁrm a competitive advantage over
others. Therefore, we do not restrict our view to R&D activities. While R&D workers play an
important role in innovation, they are not the only skilled workforce that a ﬁrm needs to beat its
rivals: managerial and organizational activities, marketing, legal and ﬁnancial services are all widely
and increasingly used by modern corporations to compete in the marketplace.
This paper is related to the literature on skill-biased technical change (SBTC).2 Like other works
in this area, we focus on the role of technical change in aﬀecting the U.S. wage structure in recent
decades. In our paper, innovation is skill-biased by assumption, as in models of exogenous SBTC
(i.e. Aghion, Howitt, Violante 2002, Caselli 1999, Galor and Moav 2000, Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull,
Violante 2000). Strictly speaking, our model is not a model of SBTC in the sense that innovation
does not increase the productivity of skilled workers. In our framework, innovation is simply a skill-
intensive activity, and wage inequality increases with the size of this activity. The innovation activity
just described implies that technical change in our model is endogenous, as in models of endogenous
2For a review of this literature see Acemoglu (2002), Aghion (2002) and Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2005).
2SBTC, or directed technical change (Acemoglu 1998 and 2002b, Kiley 1998).3 We also share with
endogenous technology models the following two other features: ﬁrst, the idea that innovation is
proﬁt-driven and that market-size is one key determinant of proﬁtability; second, the exploration of
the ‘sources’ of the type of technical progress at the roots of the observed increase in the skill premium.
The present paper contributes to this literature by exploring a new source of technical change:
the technological composition of government spending. The other sources of endogenous bias of
technical change analyzed in the literature are the market-size eﬀect produced by trade liberalization
(Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 1999, and Acemoglu, 2003) and the market-size eﬀect produced by an
increase in the relative supply of skills (Acemoglu, 1998, and, 2002b). Although our model shares
many features with Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) version of the quality-ladder model there are
three original departures: ﬁrst, on the theory side, the presence of heterogeneous industries allows
government spending to aﬀect innovation and the skill premium. This is not obtainable by simply
introducing government spending into Dinopoulos and Segerstrom’s symmetric industries framework.
Second, as stated above, while their application focuses on trade liberalization as the source of technical
change and wage inequality, we examine the role of government spending. Third, our paper puts a
stronger emphasis on quantitative analysis (calibration and simulation). To our knowledge, this is the
ﬁrst attempt to assess qualitatively and quantitatively the relevance of the ﬁscal policy channel in the
debate on technical change and wage inequality in the U.S. These two features represent the main
contribution of this paper to the literature.4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the stylized facts on government policy
and wage inequality. Section 3 sets up the model. Sections 4 and 5 derive the main results and
explain the intuition for the macroeconomic consequences of asymmetric steady states. In section
6 we calibrate the model to match salient long-run facts of the U.S. economy and focusing on the
steady-state perform a quantitative evaluation of our theoretical mechanism. Section 7 shows the
transitional dynamics implied by our model. Section 8 concludes.
2 Stylized facts
In this section we provide some motivating evidence on the dynamics of public spending composition
and wage inequality in recent decades. First, we show how the shift in the composition of government
expenditure can be viewed in a context of an overall structural change in innovation policy. Second, we
discuss some descriptive evidence on the dynamics of public spending composition and on the increase
in the skill premium in the 1970s and 1980s.
Technology policy during the Cold War consisted primarily of funding for basic research, on the
one hand, and funding for applied research and development related to federal defense projects on the
other. As suggested by Branscomb and Florida (1998), the assumption that these activities would also
sustain economic competitiveness was derived from a supply-side picture of the commercial innovation
mechanism. On one hand, there was a consensus on the so called ‘pipeline model’, which conceives
3Galor and Moav (2000) in section IV introduce endogenous technical change through human capital accumulation.
4For a deeper discussion of these three diﬀerent sources of the endogenous bias of technical change and their implica-
tions for wage inequality see Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2005).
3commercial innovations as spurring automatically from scientiﬁc research. The idea was that once
the government had provided the basic research, product development and production would follow
immediately thanks to the market mechanism. In addition, as a complement to the pipeline model,
policy makers assumed that technology created in pursuit of governmental missions, especially defense,
space and nuclear energy, would transfer itself to industry automatically and at no cost. This is the
‘spin-oﬀ hypothesis’ that together with the pipeline model formed the basic framework of the U.S.
technology policy during the Cold War, also known as the ‘Linear model’.
In this vision of the innovation process, policy makers could hit the primary target of the Soviet’s
security threat (through funds for defense research and mission-oriented development) while having
the “positive externality” of stimulating industrial innovation through the pipeline spin-oﬀ mechanism.
Hence, for policy makers, the linear model had the attractive feature of achieving economic innovation
goals without interfering with the autonomy of private ﬁrms - government did not have to ‘pick winners
and losers’.
While this model of science and technology policy was successful in containing Soviet expansionism,
in the late 1960’s there were early indications, as Japan and Germany recovered from the war and
the East Asian NICs became credible competitors on global markets, that defense-based policies were
not working equally well in promoting economic security. From the early 1970s to the late 1980s
several indicators document the erosion of the US global technological leadership. Between 1980 and
1991 the global market shares of the United States in the high-tech markets declined by 16 percent,
while Japan’s share increased by about 30 percent (NSF, 1998). Guerrieri and Milana (1991), using a
classiﬁcation scheme for high-tech sectors diﬀerent form the OECD scheme, found that Japan’s share
of high-tech export doubled from about 7 percent in 1970−73 to about 16 percent in 1988-89, while the
US share declined from 30 percent to about 21 percent. Interestingly, the data on global leadership in
R&D investment mirror the evidence on global market shares. More precisely, using OECD ANBERD
data on R&D investment for two and three-digit manufacturing industries, Impullitti (2008a) shows
that the U.S. share of global R&D investment declined from 52 percent in 1973 to 37 percent in 1991,
while Japan’s share increased from 17 percent in 1973 to 28 percent in 1991. Finally, the loss of U.S.
leadership in both markets and R&D shares is concentrated in the major high-tech sectors.5
Concerns over U.S. global competitiveness in the late 1970s and early 1980s led to a series of leg-
islative changes that collectively created an institutional environment more favorable to commercial
innovation. The introduction of this set of policies, explicitly targeted at improving the commercial-
ization of technological advances and thus clearly at odds with the linear model, can be considered
as a structural change in the U.S. system of innovation (Mowery and Rosenberg 1989 and 1993, Ham
and Mowery 1995, Krimsky 2003, and Mirowsky and Sent 2005). The new strategy involved both
innovation cost-reducing measures and demand-pull policies.
5The erosion of the American position in global high-tech markets was especially pronounced in electronics, a sector
in which Japan and East Asian new industrialized countries scored dramatic gains; and in aircrafts and parts, where the
competitiveness of European products increased rapidly (Guerrieri Milana 1991, and Tyson 1992). The larger drop in
the U.S. R&D shares takes place in Oﬃce and Computing Machineries (OCM), which accounts on average for 8 percent
of total manufacturing R&D and in Radio, TV, and Communication Equipment (RTCE), which accounts on average for
16 percent of total R&D: the U.S. share dropped from 0.76 to 0.53 in OCM and from 0.54 to 0.4 in RTCE, while Japan’s
share rose from 0.06 to 0.32 in OCM and from 0.13 to 0.26 in RTCE (Impullitti 2008a).
4The set of innovation cost-reducing policies introduced in this period basically work through the
following channels: subsidies for R&D, technology transfer, and property rights protection. The
Research & Experimentation Tax Credit established by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
was aimed at introducing tax subsidies to annual increases in R&D investment. Technology transfer
policies are represented by the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act (1980), that required
Federal Laboratories to facilitate the transfer of federally owned and originated technology to the
private sector and to local and state governments. The Small Business Innovation and Development
Act (1982), that established the Small Business Research (SBIR) program within the major Federal
R&D agencies to increase government funding of research with commercialization potential within
small, high-technology companies. The Federal Technology Transfer Act (1986), that amended the
Stevenson-Wydler Act, to authorize cooperative research and development agreements (CRADA)
between Federal laboratories and other entities, including state agencies. Finally, policies to improve
protection of intellectual property rights are the Bayh-Dole Patent Act (1980), which allowed agencies
to issue patents to small business and non proﬁt institutions, including universities, for inventions
made with agency funds; and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, established in 1982, that
substantially improved the protection of intellectual property right in litigations.
The contemporaneous introduction of this set policies was strongly aimed at creating an insti-
tutional environment that could promote commercial innovation. This constitutes a change in the
structure of U.S. innovation policy, away from the massive spending in military technology of the
post-War period. Mowery (1998) argues that this set of policies represent a “structural change” in
the US. national innovation system. There is suﬃcient consensus among technology policy scholars
that the post-1980 shift, started during the Reagan and Bush administrations and continued as a
trademark of Clinton’s economic policy, represents a crucial move towards an explicit commercial
innovation policy in the US.6
On the demand side, shifts in the composition of government spending towards innovation-intensive
goods can also be seen as part of this structural change in U.S. innovation policy. Although government
spending has never been an explicit policy tool, it has always worked as a de facto relevant innovation
policy instrument. David Hart presents the argument in the following way: “[Public] R&D spending
was typically accompanied by other measures that deserve at least as much credit for their technological
payoﬀs. For instance, the Department of Defense (DOD) not only funded much of the physical science
and engineering R&D that led to advances in semiconductors and computers, it also purchased a
large fraction of products themselves, especially the most advanced products. The DOD guaranteed
that a market for electronics would exist, inducing private investment on a scale that would not have
otherwise followed even the most promising research results” (Hart 1998 p.1). Hence, according to
this view, public procurement guaranteed a market to innovative ﬁrms, especially in early stages of
product development. There is evidence that the DOD, NASA and also other government agencies,
such as the Department of Health, contributed to private innovation via demand-pull (see Ruttan
2003, and Finkelstein 2003).
6See Mowery and Rosenberg (1989) and (1993), Ham and Mowery (1995), Krimsky (2003), and Mirowsky and Sent
(2005). For further discussion of the nature and empirical relevance of the shift in technology policy see Impullitti
(2008b).
5In this paper we propose an aggregate measure of this demand-pull channel for innovation. We
use BEA NIPA data that break down public investment between Equipment and Software (E&S
henceforth) and Structures. E&S includes a group of investment goods that are considered more
innovative than those included in structures, so we choose E&S as our high-tech aggregate.7 The focus
on investment is due to the fact that there is no aggregate data keeping track of the technological
composition of public consumption expenditures.
In ﬁgure 1 we report the evolution of the skill premium and of the composition of government
investment spending, expressed as the ratio of government investment in E&S over total government
investment. We can see that the share of public investment devoted to the high-tech aggregate, E&S,
is fairly constant from the early 1960s to the late 1970s, ﬂuctuating between 16 and 20 percent. It
then increases steadily in the 1980s, reaching 41 in 1991, and it keeps growing, but to a slower pace,
in the 1990s till reaching 48 percent in 1999. In the ﬁgure we also see the well known dynamics of
the skill premium that after declining for most of the 1970s experiences a strong acceleration in the
late 1970s.8 The relevant fact here is that both series jump from a fairly steady course to a rapidly
increasing one during the late 1970s, early 1980s. This common and contemporaneous change trends
suggests that the shift towards high-tech public spending, which began around 1974 and radically
accelerated around 1978, might have had an inﬂuence on rising inequality in the 1980s.9
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Using the same data we ﬁnd that also the composition of private investment progressively shifted
towards E&S since the late 1970s. However, the technological composition of public investment accel-
erated in the 1980s -the period when wage inequality increased more rapidly- while the rise of private
investment in E&S was concentrated in the 1990s. More precisely, the yearly average growth rate of
private investment was 9 percent while the growth rate of public investment was 16 percent in the
period 1970-90; while private spending jumped on those high growth rates only in the 1990s.10
As R&D represents an important part of innovation activity, ﬁgure 2 shows that, as was the case
for the composition of public spending, the trend of private R&D/GDP also increases substantially
in the late 1970s, along with that of the skill premium. The technological composition of government
7The recent empirical literature on sector-speciﬁc technical change conﬁrms the idea that high-tech sectors have been
the major engine of innovation in the last decades (See Hornstein et al., 2005)). Cummins and Violante (2002) ﬁnd the
average technical change in E&S over the last 30 years in the U.S. to be between 5 and 6 percent. In this literature, the
change in E&S is proxied by the diﬀerence in growth rates between constant-quality consumption prices and quality-
adjusted prices of investment in E&S. The substantial decline of the quality-adjusted price of capital equipment since
the early 1970s provides evidence of E&S-speciﬁc technical change. Recently some empirical works have shown that,
although technical change in structures is less relevant than in equipment goods, it has been positive and signiﬁcative
in the last decades. Gort, Greenwood and Rupert (1999) ﬁnd a 1 percent yearly average structures-speciﬁc technical
change during the last three decades.
8The skill premium series has been obtained merging Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante (2000) data and
Current Population Survey (1999) data, considering 1963 as the base year.
9We are not interested in explaining the decline in the skill premium observed in the 1970s. For this reason the weaker
correlation between the two series in the 1970s does not aﬀect our argument. In the literature, the decline of the skill
premium in the 1970s has been mainly attributed to an exogenous increase in the relative supply of college graduates in
those years, produced by the arrival on the job market of the Baby Boomers generation, and to the increase in college
enrollment produced by the Vietnam War draft. See Acemoglu (2002a) for a discussion.
10We also ﬁnd that the ratio of public to private investment in the innovative aggregate has been betwen 13 and 26
percent in the period 1970-90. This indicates that the scale of public E&S is not negligible in the period of interest.
6spending aﬀects the market-size of all kinds of innovation activities, of which R&D is a relevant
component.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
In our opinion this set of facts provides a suﬃcient motivation to dig deeper into the links between
public spending composition, innovation and wage inequality.
3 The model
3.1 Households
Households diﬀer in their members’ ability to become skilled workers, and the ability θ is uniformly
distributed over the unit interval. Households have identical intertemporally additive, separable, and
unit elastic preferences for an inﬁnite set of consumption goods indexed by ω ∈ [0,1], and each is
endowed with a unit of labor/study time whose supply generates no disutility. Households choose






































where N0 is the initial population and n is its constant growth rate, ρ is the common rate of time
preference, with ρ > n and where r(t) is the market interest rate. qθ(j,ω,t) is the per-member ﬂow of
good ω ∈ [0,1] of quality j ∈ {0,1,2,...} purchased by a household of ability θ ∈ (0,1) at time t ≥ 0.
p(j,ω,t) is the price of good ω of quality j at time t, cθ(t) is nominal expenditure, and Wθ(0) and
Zθ(0) are human and non-human wealth levels. A new vintage of a good ω yields a quality equal to
λ(ω) times the quality of the previous vintage, with λ(ω) > 1. Diﬀerent versions of the same good ω
are regarded by consumers as perfect substitutes after adjusting for their quality ratios, and jmax(ω,t)
denotes the maximum quality in which good ω is available at time t. As is common in quality ladders
models, we assume price competition11 at all dates, which implies that in equilibrium only the top
quality product is produced and consumed in positive amounts. T(t) is a per-capita lump-sum tax.
The instantaneous utility function has unitary elasticity of substitution, implying that goods are
perfect substitutes, once you account for quality. Thus, households maximize static utility by spreading
their expenditures evenly across the product line and by purchasing in each line only the product with
11All qualitative results maintain their validity under the opposite assumption of quantity competition.
7the lowest price per unit of quality, that is the product of quality j = jmax(ω,t). Hence, the household’s




for j = jmax(ω,t) and is zero otherwise (2)




= r(t) − ρ (3)
Individuals are ﬁnitely-lived members of inﬁnitely-lived households, being continuously born at
rate β and dying at rate δ, with β − δ = n > 0; D > 0 denotes the exogenous duration of their life12.
People are altruistic in that they care about their household’s total discounted utility according to
the intertemporally additive functional shown in (1). They choose to acquire education and become
skilled, if at all, at the beginning of their lives, and the (positive) duration of their schooling period,
during which the individual cannot work, is set at Tr < D.










t r(τ)max(θ − γ,0)wH(s)ds,
with 0 < γ < 1/2. The ability parameter is deﬁned so that a person with ability θ > γ is able to
accumulate skills (human capital) θ − γ after schooling, while a person with ability below this cut-oﬀ
gains no human capital from schooling.
We will focus on the steady-state analysis, in which all variables grow at constant rates and where
wL, wH, and cθ are all constant. It follows that r(t) = ρ at all dates, and that the individual will train






e−ρTr − e−ρD￿￿ wL
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The supply of unskilled labor at time t is:








We set wL = 1, so that the unskilled wage becomes our numeraire. A fraction (1 − θ0) of the
population decides to receive education. The skilled workforce is represented by those people that
have completed their schooling period, that is individuals born between t − D and t − Tr:
￿ t+Tr
t−D
β (1 − θ0)N(s)ds = (1 − θ0)φN(t).








< 1. The uniform distribution of workers abilities implies
that the average skills of workers that have acquired education is [(θ0 − γ) + (1 − γ)]/2. Hence, the
supply of skilled labor in eﬃciency units at time s is
H(t) = (θ0 + 1 − 2γ)(1 − θ0)φN(t)/2, (6)
12As in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999), it is easy to show that the above parameters cannot be chosen independently,
but that they must satisfy δ =
n
enD−1 and β =
nenD
enD−1 in order for the number of births at time t to match the number
of deaths at t + D.
8In steady state the growth rate of L(t) and H(t) is equal to n.
3.2 Manufacturing
Firms can hire unskilled workers to produce any consumption good ω ∈ [0,1] of the second best quality
under a constant returns to scale (CRS) technology with one worker producing one unit of product.
However, in each industry the top-quality product can be manufactured only by the ﬁrm that has
discovered it, whose rights are protected by a perfectly enforceable patent law.
As usual in Schumpeterian models with vertical innovation (see e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1991,
and Aghion and Howitt, 1992) the next best-quality of a given good is invented by means of innovation
activity performed by challenger ﬁrms in order to earn monopoly proﬁts that will be destroyed by
the next innovator. During each temporary monopoly the patentholder can sell the product at prices
higher than the unit cost. We assume that the patent expires when further innovation occurs in
the industry. Hence monopolist rents are destroyed not only by obsolescence but also because a
competitive fringe can copy the product using the same CRS technology.
The unit elastic demand structure13 encourages the monopolist to set the highest possible price
to maximize proﬁts, but the existence of a competitive fringe sets a ceiling to it equal to the lowest
unit cost of the previous quality product. This allows us to conclude that the price p(jmax(ω,t),ω,t)
of every top quality good is:
p(jmax(ω,t),ω,t) = λ(ω), for all ω ∈ [0,1] and t ≥ 0. (7)
Our ﬁscal policy tool will be sector speciﬁc per-capita public spending G(ω,t) ≥ 0, for all ω ∈ [0,1]
and t ≥ 0. The government uses tax revenues to ﬁnance public spending in diﬀerent sectors and
we assume that the government budget is balanced at every date: N(t)T(t) = N(t)
￿ 1
0 G(ω,t)dω .
Moreover, we will assume N(t)T(t) < γN(t), in order to guarantee that public expenditure is feasible.
Since we are interested in steady states, in which per-capita variables are constant, from now on we
will drop time indexes from per-capita taxation and per-capita expenditures.


















0 cθdθ is average per-capita consumption. Sectorial market-clearing conditions imply that
demand equals production of every consumption good by the ﬁrm that monopolizes it, q(ω). It follows
that the stream of proﬁts accruing to the monopolist which produces a state-of-the-art quality product
will be equal to:







A ﬁrm that produces good ω has an expected discounted value of
v(ω) =
π(ω)











13Any CES utility index with elasticity of substitution not greater than one would imply this result.
9where I(ω) denotes the Poisson arrival rate of an innovation that will destroy the monopolist’s proﬁts
in industry ω. This can be obtained assuming eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets which in equilibrium equalize
the expected return of investing in R&D to the risk-free interest rate r. In a steady state where per-
capita variables all grow at the same rate, it is easy to prove that
.
v(ω,t)
v(ω,t) = n, and from the Euler
equation (3) we obtain r = ρ. Hence the expected value of a ﬁrm becomes
v(ω) =
q(ω)(λ(ω) − 1)
ρ + I(ω) − n
. (10)
3.3 Innovation races
In each industry leaders are challenged by the innovation activity of followers that employ skilled
workers and produce a probability intensity of inventing the next version of their products. The
arrival rate of innovation in industry ω at time t is I(ω,t), and it is the aggregate summation of the
Poisson arrival rate of innovation produced by all R&D ﬁrms targeting product ω.
In each sector new ideas are introduced according to a Poisson arrival rate of innovation by use
of a CRS technology characterized by the unit cost function bwHX(ω,t), with b > 0 common in all
industries, and X(ω,t) > 0 measuring the diﬃculty of innovation in industry ω. Hence the production
of ideas is formally equivalent to buying a lottery ticket that confers to its owner the exclusive right to
the corresponding innovation proﬁts, with the aggregate rate of innovation proportional to the “number
of tickets” purchased. The Poisson speciﬁcation of the innovative process implies that the individual
contribution to innovation by each skilled labor unit gives an independent (additive) contribution to
the aggregate instantaneous probability of innovation: hence innovation productivity is the same if
each skilled worker undertakes her activity by working alone as when she works with others in large
ﬁrms.
The technological complexity index X(ω,t) has been introduced into endogenous growth theory
after Charles Jones’ (1995) empirical criticism of R&D based growth models that generate scale ef-
fects in the steady state per-capita growth rate. According to Segerstrom’s (1998) interpretation of
Jones’ (1995) solution to the “strong scale eﬀect” problem (Jones 2005), X(ω,t) is increasing in the





with positive µ, thus formalizing the idea that early discoveries ﬁsh-out the easier inventions ﬁrst,
leaving the most diﬃcult ones for the future. This formulation implies that increasing diﬃculty
of innovation causes per-capita GDP growth to vanish over time unless an ever-increasing share of
resources are invested in innovation, thereby requiring a growing educated population. As it will
become clearer later, this speciﬁcation of the diﬃculty index leads to a version of the quality ladder
model where the steady-state growth rate is proportional to the population growth rate, and policy
shocks have only temporary eﬀects on growth14. For this reason these frameworks are also called
14Cozzi (2005 and 2007) has proved that in quality ladder economies the steady state growth rate could be aﬀected
by self-fulﬁlling prophecies, despite the "semi-endogenous" structure. Hence sunspots may matter also in this model.
10“semi-endogenous” growth models.15
For industries targeted by innovation, the following free entry condition applies:
v(ω) ≡
q(ω)(λ(ω) − 1)
ρ + I(ω) − n
= bwHX(ω). (12)
where the marginal beneﬁt of innovation is equated to the marginal cost. The usual Arrow or “re-
placement eﬀect” implies that the monopolist does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to undertake any innovation
activity at the equilibrium wage (Aghion and Howitt 1992).
4 Balanced growth paths
We are now in a position to analyze the general equilibrium implications of the previous setting. Since
each ﬁnal good monopolist employs unskilled labor to manufacture each commodity, the unskilled





























λ(ω)dω. Eq.s (8), (10), and (12) imply that
N(t)
λ(ω)
[c + G(ω)] = bwHX(ω)
ρ + I(ω) − n
(λ(ω) − 1)
, (15)
which - since wH = σ












ρ + I(ω) − n
λ(ω) − 1
, for all ω ∈ [0,1], (16)
where x(ω,t) ≡
X(ω,t)
N(t) denotes the population-adjusted degrees of complexity of product ω, which will
be constant in steady-state. Similarly, the skilled labor market equilibrium implies:




In steady state all per-capita variables are constant and therefore
.
X(ω,t)
X(ω,t) = n. Hence, the speciﬁ-













ρ + n/µ − n
λ(ω) − 1
, for all ω ∈ [0,1], (18)









15See Aghion and Howitt (2005) and Jones (2005) for a discussion of semi-endogenous and fully-endogeous growth
models.
11In the present framework with quality-improving goods, growth is interpreted as the increase over




















0 I(ω,τ)dτ is the expected number of innovations in industry ω before time t. Since






dω = t I = t(n/µ). The












As usual in semi-endogenous growth models with increasing complexity the steady-state arrival rate
of innovation in every industry is a linear increasing function of the population growth rate, and the
stationary growth rate is pinned down by population growth. Growth is semi-endogenous in the sense
that policy has only temporary eﬀects on the growth rate. Every policy measure capable of increasing
the innovation arrival rate I(ω), and thus the growth rate, will also raise the R&D diﬃculty index X(ω)
according to (TEG) and in the long-run the growth rate will not be aﬀected. For what follows it is
important to notice that, although policy has no eﬀects on steady-state growth, it has permanent level
eﬀects. In particular, since we are interested in the relative demand and supply of skills, we will see
that temporary changes in the innovation arrival rate will aﬀect these levels (or ratios) permanently.
Proposition 1 If Ω−ΓG
Γ <
(1−2γ)φµσ(ρ+n/µ−n)
2nγ a steady state always exists for every distribution of
λ(ω) > 1 and G(ω) > 0. At each steady state the following properties hold:
a. G(ω) > G(ω￿) implies x(ω) > x(ω￿) and ∂x(ω)/∂G(ω) > ∂x(ω￿)/∂G(ω￿) iﬀ λ(ω) > λ(ω￿)
b. θ0 is an increasing function of Ω
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1a suggests that an increase in government spending in sector ω stimulates innovation
in that speciﬁc industry through a market size eﬀect - according to (TEG) the diﬃculty index x(ω) is
proportional to investment in innovation in sector ω. Moreover the proposition shows that 1 dollar of
government spending is more eﬀective in stimulating innovation when directed towards sectors with
high quality jumps. The importance of proposition 1b will become clearer later; for the moment it
suﬃces to note that it shows that the share of unskilled workers θ0 is increasing with the technology-
adjusted average government spending Ω.16
5 Fiscal policy rules
Here we specify rules for public spending and derive the basic result of the paper. The ﬁscal policy
rule that we use is a linear combination of two extreme rules: a perfectly symmetric rule in which
every sector gets the same share of public spending, that is G(ω) = G , and a rule that allocates public
16The average goverment spending is G =
￿ 1
0 Gωdω.
12spending in proportion to the quality jump in innovation, that is G(ω) = G
λ(ω)
λ . A linear combination
of the two extreme rules yields the general rule





with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Proposition 2 Every move from a symmetric spending rule to a rule promoting more heavily sectors
with above-average quality-jumps, that is an increase in α, increases both the relative demand and the
relative supply of skills. The relative demand shift is relatively stronger and the skill premium wH
rises.

















: Jensen’s inequality implies that ∂Ω/∂α < 0. Thus, a shift to more
asymmetric spending (an increase in α ) decreases Ω that, according to Proposition 1.a, generates a
decrease in the share of the population that decides not to acquire skills, θ0. Recalling that the skill
premium is wH = σ/(θ0 − γ), we conclude that a higher α leads to higher wage inequality.
Proposition 2 contains the basic result of the model: when government switches to a policy promot-
ing high-tech sectors more aggressively there is an increase in both the relative supply and demand of
skilled workers, but the latter dominates and the skill premium rises. This theoretical result matches
two well known stylized facts of the US labor market in the 1980s: the contemporaneous increase in
the skill premium and in the relative supply of skilled workers (see Acemoglu 2002a ﬁgure 1). This
result is directly related to our heterogeneous-industry setting. One dollar of public money in more
innovative sectors yields more additional proﬁts than those lost taking one dollar away from less inno-
vative sectors, and the net result is an increase in aggregate proﬁts and innovation activity. 17 When
industries are symmetric the proﬁt rate is the same in all industries and aggregate proﬁts are not
aﬀected by a reshuﬄing of government spending. As stated in proposition 1.a., public spending is, at
the margin, more eﬃcient when directed to more innovative industries, that is: G(ω) > G(ω￿) implies
x(ω) > x(ω￿) and ∂x(ω)/∂Gω > ∂x(ω￿)/∂G(ω￿) if and only if λ(ω) > λ(ω￿).18 Thus, reshuﬄing public
spending towards sectors with higher innovation potential raises the overall innovation activity until
the increase of the diﬃculty index brings back the economy to the exogenous growth rate g. Since in-
novation has become more diﬃcult, to keep the steady-state growth rate we need more labor resources
invested in innovation, thus the increase in the ‘level’ of labor demand produced by the policy shock
is permanent.
Finally, the increase in the relative demand for skills raises the skill premium and triggers, through
the skill-acquisition process, an increase in the relative supply of skills. Proposition 2 shows that the
demand shift dominates the supply and that in equilibrium the skill premium rises.
17From (9) we know that λ(ω) coincides with the markup over the unit cost for the sector ω. It follows that markups
are higher in high-tech sectors.
18Notice that increases in the arrival rate of innovation show up in a higher steady-state diﬃculty index x(ω), and
does not aﬀect the steady-state innovation and the growth rate g.
136 Quantitative analysis
The data shown in ﬁgure 1 suggest a correlation between the composition of public spending and
the skill premium. The model presented above provides one possible economic mechanism to explain
that correlation. In this section we try to measure the quantitative relevance of our mechanism by
calibrating a two-sector version of the model: sector 1 will be the low-tech sector and sector 2 the high-
tech one.19 Since the only available data on public spending composition concern investment, in the
calibration exercise we need to reinterpret the model in terms of intermediate goods. As is common in
the literature, an alternative interpretation of quality-ladder models is one where households consume
a homogeneous consumption good which is assembled from diﬀerentiated intermediate goods. The
static utility function in (1) can then be interpreted as a CRS production function in which superior
quality intermediate goods are more productive in manufacturing the ﬁnal good.20
The exercise consists of choosing the 8 parameters of the model {D,Tr,ρ,γ,n,µ,λ1,λ2} to match
salient long-run features of the US economy. Since we work with intermediate goods, we need to choose
our unit of time to be large enough to match their average life time. For this purpose we choose ﬁve
years as our unit of time.21 After calibrating the model we explore the eﬀects of government policy
on the skill premium between two 5-years periods, 1976-80 and 1987-91.22 We compute the increase
in the skill premium produced by shocking the model with the change in the composition of public
spending showed in ﬁgure 1, and compare it with the actual increase observed in the data.
The calibration of some parameters is standard. Since in steady-state ρ is equal to the interest
rate r, we calibrated it to match a 7 percent average real return on the stock market estimated in
Mehra and Prescott (2003); in our ﬁve-year time unit this leads to setting ρ = 0.35.23 We also explore
the sensitivity of the results to calibrating the interest rate to a lower bound of 3 percent, close to the
return on riskless assets which is often used in calibrating business cycle models, leading to ρ = 0.15,
and to an upper bound of 10 percent, which is close to Mehra and Prescott estimates of return on
assets for some recent subperiods; this leads to ρ = 0.5.
We calibrate n to match a population growth rate of 1.14% (Bureau of labor Statistics,1999).
Since our time unit is 5 years, both ρ and n must be multiplied by ﬁve, as we do in table II below.
We choose the total working life time D = 40 as in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) and the total
schooling time Tr = 5 to match the average years of college in the US - both values must be adjusted
19All the results obtained for the model with a continuum of sectors hold for this simpliﬁed version.
20See Grossman and Helpman (1991) ch. 4.
21Since there is no capital in the model we consider intermediate goods as fully depreciating every period. Average
full depreciation period of intermediate goods is 8-10 years. We choose the lenght of a period to be not greater than the
average training time, which we reasonably assume to be 5 years.
22We choose 1976-80 as the starting year because it corresponds to the moment when the composition of public
spending starts moving faster towards high-tech goods, and it is also very close to the turning point of the dynamics of
the skill premium. We limit the analysis to the period 1976-91 because these are the years where the bulk of the increase
in the U.S. skill premium took place (see ﬁgure 1).
23Jones and Williams (2000) suggest that the interest rate in R&D-driven growth models is also the equilibrium rate
of return to R&D, and so it cannot be simply calibrated to the risk-free rate on treasury bills - which is around 1%. They
in fact calibrate their R&D-driven growth model with interest rates ranging from 0.04 to 0.14. A diﬀerent argument
suggests that in the presence of eﬃcient ﬁnancial market the return on R&D ﬁrms stocks will be equalized at the margin
to that of risk-free assets, which is around 2 − 3 perecent.
14for our time unit in table II.24 Autor, Katz, and Kruger (1998) show that the relative supply of skills
(college and above over non-college) rises from 0.138 in 1970 to 0.25 in 1990. We follow this evidence
by choosing the threshold γ to bound the relative supply of skilled workers below 25 percent of the
workforce.
The crucial parameters of the calibration are the R&D diﬃculty index µ, and the quality jumps of
the low and high-tech sectors, λ1 and λ2 respectively. We calibrate the quality jumps using estimates of
the sectorial markups for 2-digit US manufacturing industries. We use the revised OECD classiﬁcation
of high-tech and low-tech sectors as in Hatzichronoglu (1997). Martins, Scarpetta, and Pilat (1996)
provide the most conservative estimates for markups in US manufacturing industries for the period
1970-92, and they also break down the industries according to their R&D intensity25. For the R&D-
intensive industries (our high-tech group) the estimated average markup is 33 percent, while for the
medium and low-tech industries the average markup is 13 percent.26 In our 5-year time frame this
implies setting λ1 = (1 + 0.13 ∗ 5) = 1.65 and λ2 = 1+0.33∗5 = 2.65. We also explore the sensitivity
of our results to setting the diﬀerence between the two markups to the maximum obtained by Martins
et al. (1996), that is 5 percent low-tech and 54 percent high-tech (λ1 = 1.25 and λ2 = 3.7), and
the minimum positive distance, 22 percent for low-tech and 29 percent for high-tech (λ1 = 2.1 and
λ2 = 2.45).
Once we have calibrated the two quality jumps we can use the equation for the growth rate to













(lnλ(1) + lnλ(2)). (22)
From the Penn World tables we take an average GDP growth rate for the period 1976-1991 in the
US of 2.3 percent and using the quality jumps, calibrated as explained above, we obtain µ equals to
0.4727.
To account for the weight of public investment expenditure in the economy we consider government
investment as a share of total private investment.28 Therefore we set β(ω) =
G(ω)










(1 + β(ω)) = q(ω).
24Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) use a training time of four years, we stretch it to ﬁve to match our time unit of
ﬁve years.
25These estimates are more conservative than those in previous estimates such as Hall(1990) and Roeger (1995) in that
they provide substantially lower values. Lower values are more plausible because they reﬂect more closely the observed
proﬁt rates.
26The four high-tech industries are drugs and medicines, oﬃce and computing machineries, electrical machineries,
and . This is in line with the OECD classiﬁcation. We are aware of using diﬀerent sector classiﬁcations for markups
and for public investment. This is due to lack of estimates of markups for the aggregates equipment and software and
strucutures, and to lack of data on goverment spending by industry.
27We use equal weights for the two sectors for simplicity. We have also performed the exercise using some measure of
the weights of the high-tech and low-tech sectors in the real economy and we get similar results. Using sectoral output
shares, for instance, we obtain a 51 percent high-tech share and a 49 percent low-tech share.
28Private spending in the model, labeled c, is consumption. In the calibration, since we work with investment data,
private spending is private investment. Notice that since we do not have data on the structure of public consumption
we cannot use GDP as the measure of the size of this economy.
15Working out the equilibrium with this modiﬁcation, reducing the system to one equation - as we did
in (A.1.1) - and substituting wH = σ
θ0−γ into it we obtain a relation between the skill premium and
the composition of public spending (share of low-tech goods
G(1)














































. Table I below summarizes our calibration.
TABLE I
S￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
parameter value moment to match source
D 8 life time after college standard
T 1 years of college standard
ρ 0.35 interest rate Mehra and Prescott (2003)
n 0.07 population growth rate Bureau of labor Statistics (1999)
γ 0.75 lower-bound for the share of unskilled Autor, Katz, Kruger (1998)
µ 0.47 GDP growth rate of 2.3% Penn World Tables
λ1 1.65 low-tech markup of 13% Martins, Scarpetta, and Pilat (1996)
λ2 2.65 high-tech markup of 33% Martins, Scarpetta, and Pilat (1996)
In our quantitative analysis we focus on two relevant 5-year periods: 1976-80, the period right
before both the skill premium and the technological bias of public spending start increasing rapidly,
and 1987-91, when the bulk of the shock has been consumed. To asses the eﬀect of public spending on
wages we use BEA NIPA data on government investment in structure (G1), our low-tech aggregate,
and E&S (G2), our high-tech aggregate.29 NIPA data on public expenditure shows the following
composition in the periods of interest: in 1976-80 average government investment in structure was 29
percent and in E&S was 7 percent of total private investment (G1
c = 0.29 and G2
c = 0.07); respectively,
in 1987-91 the low-tech expenditure share decreased to 26 percent and the high-tech share rose to 18
percent.
Table II presents the simulation results, the ﬁrst entry in each columns shows the eﬀect of the
public policy shock on the skill premium predicted by the model (∆wm
H/wm
H), the second entry











). For the observed skill premium we use CPS data from Krusell et al.
(2000) on average wages of college graduates and high-school graduates - this is also shown in ﬁgure
1. Between the two periods considered this measure of the skill premium increased by 15.8 percent.
In the benchmark calibration the policy shock produces a 1.8 percent increase in the skill premium,
which accounts for 12 percent of the observed increase in wage inequality.
29Notice that here we do not exactly use the ﬁscal policy rules speciﬁed in section 5. This is because in this simpliﬁed
version of the model those rules would not allow us to catch the entire eﬀect of a change in the composition of public
spending on the skill premium. In fact, in the case of extreme asymmetric spending (α = 1) our rule predicts that the
low-tech sector gets a share of the public spending that is proportional to it’s quality jump. While, in the data the
extreme asymmetry would mean that the spending going to the low-tech sector would be zero (G1 = 0). Thus, to keep
the model closer to the data in the quantitative excercise we use directly government investment in the two sectors, as



































bmk ρ = 0.35 0.018 0.12 0.0056 0.036 0.037 0.24
ρ min ρ = 0.15 0.023 0.15 0.0072 0.046 0.052 0.33
max ρ = 0.5 0.014 0.09 0.0046 0.029 0.028 0.18
The robustness analysis shows that this result is sensitive to the ‘technology gap’ between the two
groups of industries, that is the distance between the quality jump in low and high-tech sectors, λ1 and
λ2. At the minimum distance, obtained at a low-tech markup of 22 percent and a high-tech markup
of 30 percent (λ1,λ2 = 2.1,2.45), the model predicts a very small increase in inequality, consequently
a negligible share of inequality is explained by our mechanism (only 3.6 percent). On the other hand,
under the maximum technology gap, that is a 5 percent low-tech markup and a 110 percent high-tech
markup (λ1,λ2 = 1.25,3.7), the policy shock explains 24 percent of the observed increase in inequality.
A second robustness check shows that the results are not too sensitive to changes in the intertemporal
preference parameter ρ. Calibrating ρ to match a 3 percent interest rate, thus reducing the discount
rate to ρ = 0.15, produces a small increase in the quantitative relevance of the policy mechanism
under the benchmark technology gap: the share of inequality attributable to the shock rises from 12
percent to 15 percent. The eﬀect is stronger under the high technology gap, the share of inequality
attributable to the policy shock rises from 24 to 33 percent. The opposite result is obtained calibrating
ρ to match a 10 percent interest rate.
While the benchmark technology gap should be considered as the most plausible value (we have
no arguments for preferring the other values explored above), the upper bound for ρ, corresponding
to a 10 percent interest rate, can be considered implausible. In fact, most of the growth and business
cycle literature calibrates the discount factor to match interest rates in the range (0.3,0.7). It follows
that our model can plausibly generate between 12 and 15 percent of the observed change in the skill
premium.30
Quantitatively our mechanism explains a relatively small but not negligible part of the observed
increase in the skill premium. We do not consider this a shortcoming of the paper for the following
30It is worth noticing that the measure of inequality that we use, wH/wL, could overstate the increase in the skill
premium when we bring the model to the data. This happens because the average wage of skilled workers in the model
is
￿ 1
θ0(θ − γ)wHdF (θ) = (θ0 + 1 − 2γ)wH, the skilled wage times the average quality (eﬃciency) of skilled workers,
which is smaller than wH. We do not use this measure in the calibration because there is a sempliﬁcation in the model
that counterbalances the overstatement of the skill premium generated by using wH as average skilled wages. In fact
we assumed that unskilled workers do not accumulate human capital, and so their average wage is simply wL. In the
data average wages of both skilled and unskilled are computed taking into account the ‘abilities’, or human capital, of
heterogeneous workers in the two groups. Hence, using wL in the model for the average unskilled wage understates the
real measure of the skill premium. Our take is to leave human capital accumulation out of the measure of inequality
in the calibration to avoid distortions in both directions. Nevertheless, we have run our simulation for the average skill
premium in the model, and as expected the quantitative eﬀects of the policy shock is smaller but not substantially:
with the benchmark calibration the model explains 9 instead of 12 percent of the observed increase in inequality. The
reduction in the quatitative eﬀects is due to the fact that when the relatice supply of skills increases the average quality
of skilled workers declines, while by construction the model cannot account for the reduction in the average quality of
unskilled workers, since the unskilled wage is ﬁxed to 1.
17reasons: ﬁrst, as well recognized in the literature, the increase in the US skill premium in the period
between the late 1970s and the 1990s cannot be attributable to a single factor. Technical change,
institutional change (i.e. minimum wages and deunionization), and globalization (i.e., North-South
and North-North trade, oﬀshoring, and technology diﬀusion) all seem to have contributed to some
extent to the observed changes in the wage structure (see i.e. Di Nardo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 1996,
Autor and Katz, 1999, Card and Di Nardo, 2002, Feenstra and Hanson, 2003). Secondly, in the
literature focusing on the endogenous bias of technical change, to which our paper belongs, we either
do not ﬁnd any attempt at a quantitative evaluation of the mechanism studied theoretically, or we ﬁnd
quantitative evaluations supporting the view that no single source of technical change can be viewed
as “the” main factor behind wage inequality. The quantitative relevance of Acemoglu’s directed
technical change model has not being assessed yet31. The calibration in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom
(1999) shows that a decrease in the common tariﬀ between the US and its (Northern) trade partners
from 27 percent in the 1970 to 2.5 in 1990 increases the skill premium by 4.5 percent, which account
for about 25 percent of the total increase in the skill premium. A value higher then the one we ﬁnd
but surely not explaining most the observed increase in inequality.
Finally, the broad goal of this paper is that of proposing a ﬁrst attempt at a quantitative evalua-
tion of the role of innovation policy in shaping technical change and the wage structure. Government
investment composition is only one part of the shift in the structure of innovation policy that took
place in the 1970s and 1980s, and we do not expect it to have a very large eﬀect on the wage premium.
We do expect, though, that with the availability of better data (i.e. data that include the techno-
logical composition of public consumption and more disaggregated sectorial and ﬁrm-level data) the
composition of public spending together with the supply-side policies discussed in the section 2 may
explain a larger share of the increase in the US wage inequality.
7 Transitional dynamics
The model presented in this paper allows us to capture the eﬀects of a change in the composition
of public spending on the skill premium. We have shown in the previous steady-state analysis that
permanent changes in the composition of public spending in favour of innovative goods can explain
permanent changes in the skill premium in the US between 1976 and 1991. This approximates what
happened in the economy, where of course changes in all variables have taken place more gradually.
For example, the change in government expenditure composition shown in the stylized facts section
was gradual and relatively steady. Since we are assuming rational expectations, it is desirable to
assume that the decision makers in the stylized economy we are analyzing learned at some point that
such a policy break was taking place. In fact, a sequence of surprises would hardly be consistent with
the quite regular pattern of public spending change observed in the data.
Hence, we deem it important to test our model’s prediction in the face of the assumption that
31One reason for this is that for the source at the roots of the endogenous bias of technical change they focus on, the
increase in the relative supply of skills, to produce any positive eﬀect on the skill premium, the elasticity of substitution
between skilled and unskilled workers must be above 2, while all major estiamates point to a value around or below 1.5
(see Acemoglu, 2002a).
18agents knew at the beginning of the period, 1976, the paradigm shift that would gradually have brought
the government expenditure composition up to its 1991 level. This assumption is most natural within
the fully rational expectations approach we are adopting. Speciﬁcally, let us - as before - call βt(ω)
the time t value of government expenditure in sector ω ∈ [0,1] as a fraction of private consumption.
Let us assume that these fractions change according to the following diﬀerential equations:
·
βt(ω) = (1 − ψ)(G(ω) − βt(ω)), ω ∈ [0,1] (24)
where G(ω), ω ∈ [0,1] are the long-run (steady-state) government expenditure shares and ψ < 1.
Equations (24) are globally stable, and the lower ψ the quicker the government expenditure speed of
adjustment toward the new steady state. The paradigm shift occurred after 1976 can be interpreted
as a sudden permanent change in G(ω): the new values of the G(ω), ω ∈ [0,1] implies that the old
steady state is left forever and the economy sluggishly starts heading to the new one, according to
eq.s (24). Under rational expectations all the relevant eﬀects of the new eq.s (24) are assumed to
be correctly anticipated by the agents. Of course, such transitional dynamics behavior of the policy
variables entails a transitional dynamics behavior of all the endogenous variables. More importantly,
the expectation of a transition in the government expenditure composition during the relevant period
aﬀects the individual education and consumption decisions, wages, as well as ﬁrm production and
R&D employment decisions.
When incorporating a permanent change in vector G(ω), ω ∈ [0,1] of eq.s (24) in a fully dynamic
version of our model, there is a number of technical issues to consider, as the forward-looking aspect
of the educational choice renders time t’s schooling choice dependent on the whole future trajectory
of the skill premium and of the interest rates, which are necessarily oﬀ their steady state values.32
Moreover, the values of the stock variables - human capital and technological diﬃculty indexes - after
the shift would still reﬂect for long time the results of the past education and R&D employment choices.
This renders the formal derivation of the dynamics very challenging, because in some of the diﬀerential
equations state variables values are forwarded or lagged in time. However, a discretized version of these
equations can be solved and their stability properties analyzed. We solve the transitional dynamics
numerically, and report the results in ﬁgure 3 below. All our simulations satisfy Blanchard-Kahn
conditions and hence the equilibrium trajectories obtained are unique. Moreover, we do not restrict
the analysis to a local approximation, but simulate the whole non-linear saddle paths. Consistently
with our previous steady-state analysis, we have coarsely partitioned the set of industries into "low
tech" industries and "high tech" industries, assuming an equal weight33. All parameters have been
calibrated from their steady-state values, as shown in the previous section. In what follows, we
show the numerical simulations of the whole transitional paths of the relevant endogenous variable
in response to the change in the government expenditure expected (future) steady-state levels. The
only simplifying assumption that we adopt in the simulation of the transition paths is that of keeping
the interest rate at its steady-state value, calibrated at 7 percent. This is motivated by the fact that
in the data the average return on assets do not vary much in the period considered (see Mehra and
32The equilibrium dynamic systems of equations is derived in appendix II.
33This could be easily generalized.
19Prescott, 2005). The results are reported in ﬁgure 3 below.
[Figure 3 about here]
As in the comparative statics exercise of the previous section, we let the public spending compo-
sition change from its 1976-80 value, G1/c = 0.29 and G2/c = 0.07, to its 1987-91 value G1/c = 0.26
and G2/c = 0.18. This time though, the change from the initial to the ﬁnal period will take place
gradually according to (24). In the ﬁgure, we can see how the trajectories of government spending,
which represent our policy shock, evolve, and the eﬀect they produce on the endogenous variables
of the model.34 All responses of endogenous variables to the policy shock are in line with what we
found in the steady-state analysis in proposition 2, and in its quantitative application in the previous
section. More precisely, the high-tech arrival rate of innovation increases and then, as the high-tech
R&D diﬃculty increases, slowly returns to the exogenous steady-state level n/µ. The education choice
mechanism implies that in equilibrium the employment of skilled workers increases as well. The low-
tech sector shows a similar dynamics but in the opposite direction. These shifts in employment imply
that the relative employment of unskilled workers, θ0(t), decreases. Contemporary to skill upgrading,
as the composition of public spending rises, the relative wage of skilled workers increases, thus qualita-
tively reproducing the dynamics of the skill premium observed in the data. The speed of convergence
looks very slow because we have approximated continuous time with a large number of discrete sub-
periods. Of course the aim of this transitional dynamics exercise is merely to show that qualitatively
realistic trajectories can be generated by our fully rational general equilibrium model.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that the technological content of government spending played a signiﬁcant
role in explaining the wave of innovations that hit the US economy in recent decades and its eﬀects on
the wage structure. The interaction between policy and the heterogeneous industry structure yields
the basic theoretical contribution of the paper: a shift in the composition of public spending towards
highly innovative sectors increases aggregate expenditure in innovation and the skill premium.
We identify and quantify the role of a new source of technical change, the technological composition
of public spending, which complements the role of international trade (Dinopoulos and Segerstrom
1999 and Acemoglu 2003) and of the relative supply of skills (Acemoglu 1998 and 2002b, and Kiley
1998) in endogenizing the factor bias of technical change.35 In a calibrated version of the model we
show that the shift of US public spending toward more innovative industries can explain between 12
and 15 percent of the observed increase in the skill premium between 1976 and 1991.
This paper represents a ﬁrst attempt to evaluate the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on technology and wages
and is amenable to many extensions. First, further research could be devoted to ﬁll the data gap that
34Here we have set our unit of time to 1 because simulating the model for many periods improves the convergence
properties of the solution algorithm.
35It is worth stressing once again that our model is not, strictly speaking, a model of skill-biased technical change.
However, introducing endogenous factor-bias in the set-up and assuming that high-tech goods are produced by skilled
workers and low-tech goods by unskilled workers, the composition of government spending would have the same qualitative
eﬀects on inequality.
20prevents a more complete evaluation of the magnitude of the policy eﬀects on wages. Lacking data on
the technological composition of aggregate government procurement, in our empirical analyses we have
used the only available sub-sample: the composition of government investment. Despite the support
for our theory provided by such data, a larger sample of government procurement would certainly
reﬁne the results. Hence, some eﬀort could be devoted to the collection of data on the composition of
public consumption between high-tech and low-tech sectors; this would allow for a better quantitative
assessment of our demand-side policy channel.
A second line of future research would involve a more complete investigation of the policy channel
by explicitly modeling the supply-side innovation policy tools introduced in the 1980s and discussed
in section 2, together with the demand-side policy explored in this paper, and evaluate the overall
eﬀect of these policies on the factor bias of technical change and on wage inequality. Impullitti (2008b)
shows that a major obstacle in this direction of research is the diﬃculty of quantifying the economic
magnitude of the supply-side policies.
The theoretical link between the composition of government spending and long-run growth is of
some interest in itself - besides the implications for wage inequality explored here - and worth of
further research. The paper highlights a mechanism of revenue-neutral selective growth policy that
can be relevant for recent policy debates, especially in those countries that, burdened by large public
debt, wish to stimulate growth without using deﬁcit spending. For instance, low-cost growth policies
have recently played a central role in the debate on the implementation of the Lisbon Agenda in the
E.U.. (see Sapir 2003). The existing papers tackling the eﬀect of the composition of public spending on
growth focus on diﬀerent dimensions of spending composition, such as public goods versus transfers,
but cannot focus on the sectorial composition because they use models with homogeneous industries
(i.e. Peretto, 2003, and 2007). In the companion paper, Cozzi and Impullitti (2008), we complement
the existing literature using our model to analyze the interaction between the composition of ﬁscal
policy (taxes and spending) and the asymmetric-industry structure, exploring the implications for
growth. In both the semi-endogenous and the fully-endogenous growth framework we analyze how
ﬁscal policy can be used to select the most dynamic industries and promote growth.
9 Appendix I: proofs




bσ(ρ + n/µ − n)
￿
(θ0 − Ω)(Γ−1 − 1) + (G − Ω)
￿
(A1)
and substituting this into (19) we obtain the following synthetic equilibrium condition:
(θ0 + 1 − 2γ)(1 − θ0)φ/2 =
n(θ0 − γ)
µσ(ρ + n/µ − n)
￿
(θ0 − Ω)(Γ−1 − 1) + (G − Ω)
￿
. (A.1.1)
The LHS of this eq. (A11) is a strictly concave quadratic polynomial with roots on 2γ − 1 and 1,
and the RHS of eq. (A11) is a strictly convex quadratic polynomial with roots γ and Ω−ΓG
1−Γ . It follows
21that, if the stated parameter restrictions are satisﬁed, there exists always one and only one real and
positive solution θ0 ∈ (γ,1). The proof follows from the fact that the speciﬁed parameter restriction
allows the intercept (the value of the polynomial at θ0 = 0) of the LHS polynomial to be bigger than
in intercept of the RHS polynomial. Speciﬁcally LHS(0) > RHS(0) implies:
(1 − 2γ)φ/2 >
nγ





which rearranged leads to the parameter restriction. It is easy to see that this condition allows for a
unique solution36. Moreover for Minkowski’s inequality Ω − ΓG < 0, therefore when 1 − 2γ > 0 no
restriction on parameters is needed for a unique solution.










bσ(ρ + n/µ − n)
= x(ω),









bσ(ρ + n/µ − n)
,
which is always positive since λ(ω) > 1, θ0 > γ and ρ > n. From this derivative we can also see
that ∂x(ω)/∂Gω > ∂x(ω)/∂Gω￿ when (λ(ω) − 1)/λ(ω) > (λ(ω) − 1)/λ(ω) which is always true if
λ(ω) > λ(ω).
Proof of Proposition 1.b Rearranging (A11) we get a single polynomial in θ0 and Ω:
F (θ0;Ω) =
n(θ0 − γ)
µσ(ρ + n/µ − n)
￿
(θ0 − Ω)(Γ−1 − 1) + (G − Ω)
￿
− (θ0 + 1 − 2γ)(1 − θ0)φ/2. (A.1.2)

















µσ(ρ+n/µ−n)(Γ−1 − 1) + φ(θ0 − γ)
> 0
This results follows from the fact that θ0 > γ, ρ > n, Γ−1 > 1 and ﬁnally, from (A1) we know
that the expression inside the square brackets is greater than zero.
10 Appendix II: transitional dynamics
The schooling choice leading to eq. (4) in the paper implies, oﬀ steady states, the following ability
threshold θ0(t):
36It is easy to check that all parameters restriction are satisﬁed by the number we use in the calibration excercise.










In our numerical simulations we have chosen to set r(t) = ρ, which facilitates the convergence
of the numerical algorithm. In fact, though the analysis could be generalized, since in our relatively
long time period the exogenous policy variables G modify substantially from initial to the ﬁnal steady
state, convergence is much for diﬃcult to achieve than in a more standard local analysis. Hence the
previous equation becomes:








t+Tr e−ρ(s−t)wH(s)ds and diﬀerentiating with respect to t:
·
WS(t) = e−ρDwH(t + D) − e−ρTrwH(t + Tr) + ρWS(t), (A 2.4)
which in the steady state implies: WS = e−Trρ−e−Dρ
ρ wH. In light of the previous deﬁnitions, we can
rewrite eq. (25) as:




In the steady state: θ0 = γ + 1−e−Dρ
(e−Trρ−e−Dρ)wH.







where β is the birth rate, Nt is the population at time t, and θ0(s) is the education ability threshold
at time s. We stationarize unskilled labour supply by dividing it by the population level, m(t) ≡
M(t)
N(t).
Diﬀerentiating with respect to time:
˙ m(t) = βθ0(t) − βe−nDθ0(t − D) − nm(t) (A 2.6)
The unskilled labour market equilibrium (where 1 stands for low tech 2 for high tech - using equal




((c(t) + β1(t)c(t))/λ1) + ((c(t) + β2(t)c(t))/λ2), (A 2.7)
where β1(t) is the government expenditure in low tech products as a fraction of private consumption
and β2(t) is the government expenditure in high tech products as a fraction of private consumption.
These shares change according to diﬀerential equations:
·
β1(t) = (1 − ψ)(G1 − β1(t)), and (A 2.8a)
·
β2(t) = (1 − ψ)(G2 − β2(t)), (A 2.8b)
23where G1 and G2 are the long run (steady state) government expenditure shares, as in (a two sector
approximation of) eq. (24).




en(s−t)(1 − θ0(s))(1 + θ0(s) − 2γ)
2
ds.





e−nTr(1−θ0(t−Tr))(1 + θ0(t − Tr) − 2γ)−
β
2
e−nD(1−θ0(t−D))(1 + θ0(t − D) − 2γ),
(A 2.9)
implying steady state level h = β[en(−Tr)−en(−D)](1−θ0)(1+θ0−2γ)
2n .
We know from the deﬁnitions in the text that the arrival rate of innovation in industry ω ∈ [0,1]at
time t is I(ω,t) and the per capita technological complexity index follows:
.
x(t,ω)
x(t,ω) = µI(t,ω)−n. In our








= µI2(t) − n. (A 2.10b)
Hence the skilled labour market equilibrium (where 2 for high tech and 1 for low tech - using equal








Notice that, from the main text, the free entry condition into R&D is
v(t,ω) = bwHx(t,ω), (A 2.12)




= r(t) − ρ (A 2.13)
Rewriting the main text eq. (12) as
v1(t) =
λ1−1
λ1 (c(t) + β1(t))




, and (A 2.14a)
v2(t) =
λ2−1
λ2 (c(t) + β2(t))





Eq.s (A 2.4)- (A 2.14b) incorporates a system of delayed diﬀerential equations in the following
unknown functions of time: θ0(t), c(t), WS(t), wH(t), h(t), m(t), β1(t), β2(t), x1(t), x2(t), I1(t),
I2(t), v1(t), v2(t). They cannot be solved analytically, but we can discretize them and simulate them
numerically. This has been done in the text. The existence of leads and lags implies a large number of
eigenvalues. Our discrete time simulations have been carried out using Matlab and Dynare softwares37.
37The .mod ﬁles used for the simulation and the .m ﬁles used to ﬁnd the steady state are available upon request to
the authors.
24In our simulations, the steady state was saddle point stable and the Blanchard-Kahn conditions for
the determinacy of the equilibrium were satisﬁed.
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Source: BEA NIPA tables sec. 5 for government spending composition, and the skill premium is taken from
Krusell et al. (2000) and CPS (1999). Government spending composition is government investment in R&S
as a share of total public investment.











































Source: R&D data are taken from NSF Science and Engineering indicators (2004).
29Figure 3. Transitional dynamics
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Note: the dotted lines represent the initial position of the economy
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